In this letter, the performance of a quantum key distribution (QKD) free-space optical (FSO) system is analyzed while taking a generalized pointing error model into account. More specifically, closed-form expressions for the average received powers at both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are derived. In addition, their corresponding asymptotic results valid in the high telescope gain regime are also presented. To capture the secure performance, we also investigate the ratio of received powers at the eavesdropper and at the legitimate receiver. Further, in some special cases, we find the optimal telescope gains for the received powers at both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, as well as the power ratio, which is important and useful for a secure QKD FSO system design. Finally, some selected numerical results are presented to illustrate the mathematical formalism and validate the accuracy of the derived analytical expressions.
I. INTRODUCTION
T O ACHIEVE confidential communications, a one-timepad scheme was proposed by [1] , where a secret key is shared between two legitimate parties. Due to the reliance only on the computational complexity, this traditional key distribution method is fundamentally insecure [2] . This is particularly true with the fast development of large-scale quantum computers over the last decade, which is making the current public key infrastructure more and more vulnerable [3] . In this context, quantum key distribution (QKD), a promising application of cryptography, provides unconditional security based on the law of quantum physics and quantum non-cloning theorem [4] . QKD can be implemented in two kinds of medium, namely optical fiber and free-space optical (FSO) links. Due to its costeffectiveness, high-bandwidth availability, deployment flexibility and interference-immunity, FSO is an excellent choice for the terrestrial backhaul solution [1] and the feeder link of very high throughput satellites [2] . However, in the FSO systems, stochastic jitter and vibration of the pointing direction caused Manuscript received June 15, 2019; accepted July 9, 2019. Date of publication July 15, 2019; date of current version October 9, 2019. This work was funded by the office of sponsored research (OSR) at KAUST. The work of H. Zhao was done while he was studying at KAUST. The associate editor coordinating the review of this letter and approving it for publication was M. Koca by atmospheric turbulence or building sway should be taken into account [5] - [7] . An inevitable drawback in the QKD FSO systems is backflash in the legitimate receiver side, when the legitimate receiver adopts a common detection method, relying on a single photon avalanche photodiode (SPAD) [8] - [10] . Indeed, with the SPAD detection scheme, an avalanche happens, resulting in the emission of a secondary photon, i.e., backflash, which can be captured by eavesdroppers. Kupferman and Arnon in [10] have recently presented an analytical framework to evaluate the impact of backflash on the performance of QKD FSO systems. However, in their investigation, the adopted model for the azimuth and elevation pointing error angles assumed zero mean and equal variance for both angles, and the pointing error angle at eavesdroppers was set to zero. However, for real life deployment, QKD FSO systems may have to operate under different and more general conditions. Further, the authors in [10] did not investigate the optimal point of the telescope gain to maximize the received power at the legitimate receiver.
In this letter, we consider a generalized pointing error model, in which the azimuth and elevation pointing error angles at the legitimate receiver have arbitrary and different mean and variance. In addition, we do not limit the pointing error angle at the eavesdropper to be very close to zero. Under this general setup, we are still able to offer closed-form expressions for the average received powers at both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. Moreover, the corresponding maximum point of the telescope gain are found in some special cases. To simplify the expressions and get obviously some additional insights, we also derive simple asymptotic expressions when the telescope gain is sufficiently large. Finally, the ratio of the received powers at the eavesdropper and legitimate receiver is analyzed, and the corresponding extreme point of the telescope gain is also obtained in a particular case of interest.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In an QKD FSO system, an absolutely static source (S) transmits an information photon to a destination (D) on a vibrating platform (such as a laser satellite), resulting in a random pointing error at D. Due to the avalanche of the SPAD detection method, a secondary photon will be emitted, called backflash, which can be detected by a third party, i.e., eavesdropper (E). This communications scenario is presented in Fig. 1 and elevation pointing error angles, respectively. Like in [10] , we assume that θ H and θ V are Gaussian random variables (RVs). However, we consider the general case in which these RVs are not necessarily with zero mean and the same variance.
, where μ V and σ 2 V (or μ H and σ 2 H ) are the mean and variance of θ V (or θ H ). In this case, it is well known that θ follows the Beckmann distribution [11] , where the moment-generating function (MGF) of θ 2 is known to be given by [11] 
where E{·} represents the average operator. By setting some specific values for the parameters of the MGF of the Beckmann distribution in (6) of [12] , the form of (1) can be also easily obtained.
III. RECEIVED POWER AT D
From [5] , [10] , the received power at D is given by
where G D is the telescope gain of D and L (θ) = exp −G D θ 2 is the corresponding pointing loss factor. In (2), K 1 is constant, depending on the system characteristic, given by
where η q is the quantum efficiency, λ is the wavelength, P S and G S are the transmit power and telescope gain of S, respectively, L A (D 1 ) is the atmospheric loss with respect to the distance D 1 , and η S and η D are the optical efficiencies at S and D, respectively. The average received power at D with respect to θ can be written as
Substituting the MGF of θ 2 in (1) into (4) yields
A. Asymptotic Result
which shows a bound for P D . It implies when the telescope gain of D is sufficiently large, the received power at D reaches a constant asymptotic value.
B. Maximization of P D
When σ V = σ H = σ, taking the natural base of both sides in (5) yields
Let x = GD 1+2σ 2 GD and f (x) = ln P D . (7) can be further written as
Let the first derivative of f (x) with respect to x be equal to zero, and a unique stationary point can be obtained as
From the first derivative of f (x), we can easily see that
is an increasing function over (0, x ), and a decreasing function over (x , +∞). To summarize, x is the uniquely maximum point for f (x). In view of the positive property of G D and the function property of x = GD 1+2σ 2 GD , the corresponding optimal point G D that maximizes P D can be written as
otherwise.
IV. RECEIVED POWER AT E
The information intercept relies on the backflash, so the received power at E is given by [10] 
where
, and α is the pointing direction error angle due to backflash. In (11), K 2 is given by
where L A (D 2 ) is the atmospheric loss with respect to the distance D 2 , and η f , η E and G E are the backflash probability, optical efficiency and telescope gain of E, respectively. The average received power at E can be written as
where the expectation term can be further written as
By using the probability density functions of θ V and θ H , closed-form expressions for the two expectation operators in (14) can be derived as
respectively. A closed-form expression for P E can finally be derived for arbitrary μ V , μ H , σ V , σ H , and α as
(17)
A. Special Cases
If α = 0, which means that E is in the vicinity of S, P E becomes
.
In the α = 0 case, when G D → +∞, P E is approximately equal to
which shows that P E is approximately proportional to G D for G D → +∞ and α = 0.
B. Maximization of P E
For μ V = μ H = 0 and σ V = σ H = σ, P E can be simplified as
The first derivative of P E with respect to G D is given by (21), as shown at the bottom of this page, where the positive or negative value depends only on the last term, i.e.,
which is a standard univariate cubic equation with respect to G D . If σ and α are known, we can easily find the roots for Θ = 0 and the positive and negative value intervals for ∂P E ∂GD , and thereby finding the extreme points for P E . Specially, when G D = 0, Θ = 4 is positive, so over G D ∈ (0, +∞), P E must increase first. The trend and extreme point of P E are very useful and important for the secure system design.
V. RATIO OF P E TO P D
An important metric for the secure analysis is the ratio of P E to P D , which can be easily derived by using the closedform expressions for P E and P D , is given by
This expression is relatively complicated, and does not provide us some useful insights for the secure system design. Here, we consider some special cases to analyze this ratio. For μ V = μ H = 0 and σ V = σ H = σ, the expression for Δ can be simplified as
The first derivative of Δ with respect to G D is shown in (25), as shown at the bottom of this page, where the positive or negative value of ∂Δ ∂GD depends only on Θ 2 , a standard univariate quartic equation. If α and σ are known, the roots for Θ 2 = 0 can be easily derived, and the positive and negative value intervals can be also determined. Thus, we can analyze the changing trend of Δ and derive the extreme points.
When
The first derivative of Δ with respect to G D in (26) is
(27)
It is obvious that for G D > 1 2 , ∂Δ ∂GD must be positive. As G D 1 in the most practical cases, we can treat ∂Δ ∂GD as a positive value, and therefore, Δ always increases as G D grows. If G D is sufficiently large, Δ can be approximately obtained by
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To simplify the parameter setting, D 1 = D 2 = 900 km, L A (D1) = L A (D2) = 0.5, λ = 780 nm, P S = 0 dB, G S = G E = 10 11 , η f = 0.04, η q = 0.1, and η S = η D = 0.9 are assumed in the following simulation results. In each Monte-Carlo simulation result, 10 7 realizations are generated to get the corresponding average value according to the statistical properties, i.e., μ V , μ H , σ V and σ H .
As shown in Fig. 1 , the received power at D increases as G D grows, due to the improved telescope gain. When G D is sufficiently large, P D reaches an asymptotic bound, as proved in (6) . It is obvious that P D is improved with decreasing μ H , because a smaller μ H means a better pointing direction. The maximum points are also marked in Fig. 1 , which are derived from the maximization analysis for P D , where the maximum points for μ 2 V + μ 2 H < 2σ 2 are infinity. Fig. 2 plots P E versus G D for different values of α. P E for α > 0 increases first, and reaches a vertex before a sharp decline, while P E for α = 0 always increases with increasing G D , where the asymptotic results are derived by (19). When G D is sufficiently large, P E becomes lower as α grows, because a larger α means a larger distance between the transmitter and eavesdropper. The maximum points in Fig. 2 are obtained in the analysis of Subsection IV-B.
To validate the correctness of (17) for the general pointing errors, we also vary the values of μ V and σ 2 V in Figs. 3-4 , respectively. From Figs. 3-4 , we can easily see that a lower μ V (or a large σ 2 V ) results in a larger P E . More specifically, P E under different values of μ V almost converges in the low and high G D regions, and the gap is only obvious in the medium G D region. In the σ 2 V changing case, the gap of P E under different σ 2 V becomes larger with increasing G D . In Fig. 5 , Δ for α > 0 increases first before achieving a vertex after which this figure is rapidly falling, rather than a continuous growth in the figure for α = 0, where the asymptotic results are obtained by (28). The maximum points for (24) are also presented in Fig. 5 , where the decreasing trend of maximum points are obvious with increasing α.
To present more general pointing error cases, we consider different values of μ V and μ H , and set the same variance of θ V and θ H in Fig. 6 . There is an increasing trend of Δ as the variance grows, although the difference of Δ among different variances is not obvious in the low G D region.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this letter, closed-form expressions for P D , P E , and Δ were derived, and simplified expressions in some special cases were also given. To get more design insights, we performed an analytical maximization for P D , P E , and Δ based on some special settings of some selected parameters. In the numerical section, we used the Monte-Carlo simulations to validate the correctness of our newly derived expressions. From both the derived expressions and numerical results, we can get some design guidelines for the telescope gain at the legitimate receiver to achieve a specific purpose, shown as follows:
• If the legitimate receiver only wants to improve its received power (without taking the eavesdropper into account) in the σ 2 V = σ 2 H case, the optimal G D can be found by (10) , which depends on the parameter setting, i.e., may not just make G D as large as possible (shown in Fig. 1 ).
• If we only want to make P E lower, the legitimate receiver should avoid the optimal G D for P E , where the impact of P D is neglected due to the priority of security. From Fig. 2 , we should make G D as small (or large) as possible to avoid the vertex for α = 0. When α = 0, decreasing G D is the only way to get better security. • If we need to balance the received power performance between the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, Δ should be taken into account, which reflects the joint effect of G D on P D and P E . From Figs. 5-6, to make P D larger and P E smaller for α = 0, the legitimate receiver can increase G D until arriving to a specific threshold. If α = 0, we have no choice but to decrease G D .
